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Comment
THE SUPPRESSION SANCTION UNDER THE ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT FOR VIOLATIONS'
OF THE PRIVATE ONE-PARTY CONSENT
EXCEPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Roughly twenty years ago, Congress sought to rectify, through leg-
islation, an alarming set of problems that were and are by-products of
major technological achievements in the area of communications.2 Con-
gress saw as troubling the potential impingement on privacy that would
occur if communications technology were to be used to intercept or
"eavesdrop" upon oral or wire communications between persons. 3 In
response to this threat, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III). 4 Title III im-
posed civil and criminal liability5 for interceptions of wire or oral com-
1. In this Comment, a "violation" of the private one-party consent
exception to Title III means a failure to fall within the exception because the
interception was made for an improper purpose. For a further discussion of this
exception, see infra notes 57-80 and accompanying text.
2. Congress found a troubling problem in the growth of scientific and tech-
nological developments that enabled the widespread use and abuse of electronic
surveillance techniques. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2154.
However, while recognizing this problem, Congress additionally observed
the need for law enforcement personnel to intercept, with proper supervision,
communications necessary to obtain evidence of organized crime. Act of June
19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 § 801(c), 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
237, 253.
3. Extensive wiretapping and other modern devices were being used to
monitor private conversations without the control of legal sanctions. Act ofJune
19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 § 801(a), 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
237, 253. As a result, Congress sought legislation to alleviate the problem. Id.
§ 801 (b).
4. Act ofJune 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1968), amended by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter Title III].
This act also contains four other titles. Title I deals with federal grant pro-
grams for law enforcement assistance. Title II contains provisions regarding
inadmissability of voluntary confessions in state and federal courts as well as the
admissability of eyewitness testimony. See id. Title IV authorizes assistance to
the states for the control of firearms. See id. §§ 2113-2114. Title V is a general
separability provision. See id. § 2114.
5. Title III provides for recovery of civil damages for "any person whose
wire, oral or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed or intentionally
used in violation of [Title III] .... " 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (Supp. IV 1986). This
(111)
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munications 6 unless the interceptions fell within one of the statutory
exceptions. 7 Title III was amended extensively by the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 1986,8 to update and clarify Title III in light
section further provides liquidated damages in the event actual damages can not
be shown. Id. § 2520(c).
In order to recover under § 2520, the plaintiff must prove a violation of
§ 2511 of the statute. Section 2511 prohibits an individual from willfully inter-
cepting or attempting to intercept wire or oral communications, and willfully
disclosing or using the contents of wire or oral communications that the individ-
ual knew were obtained in violation of Title III. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1986). See
generally Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance- Title III of the Crime Control
Act of 1968, 23 RUrGERS L. REV. 319 (1969) (comprehensive discussion of Title
III in entirety as originally enacted).
For a discussion of private actions under Title III, see Fourth Circuit Re-
view, Statutes of Limitations and Private Actions Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 614, 614-24 (1984).
Additionally, Title III provides criminal penalties for one who violates the provi-
sions of§ 2511. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4).
6. An "interception" occurs under Title III upon "the aural or other acqui-
sition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (Supp.
IV 1986). "'Wire communication' means any aural transfer made in whole or in
part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the
aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the
point of reception .. " Id. § 2510(1). " 'Oral communication' means any oral
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such commu-
nication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expec-
tation, but such term does not include any electronic communication[.]" Id.
§ 2510(2).
Under the 1986 amendments to the Act, interceptions of "electronic com-
munications" are also prohibited. See id. § 251 1(1)(a). With a few exceptions,
"'electronic communication' means any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted . . . by a wire,
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photo-optical system that affects inter-
state ... commerce ... " Id. § 2510(12). "Electronic communication" does not
include wire or oral communications. Id. § 2510(12)(b).
7. The exceptions to Title III include the following: (1) a communication
carrier intercepting communications in the normal course of employment, 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a) (Supp. IV 1986); (2) an agent of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission intercepting a communication in the normal course of em-
ployment, id. § 2511 (2)(b); (3) a person acting under color of law intercepting a
communication if he is a party to the communication and has given his prior
consent, id. § 2511(2)(c); (4) a person not acting under color of law intercepting
a communication if one of the parties has given his prior consent provided that
the interception is not committed for a criminal or tortious purpose, id
§ 251 1(2)(d); (5) an officer, employee or agent of the United States conducting
electronic surveillance in the ordinary course of his official duty, id. § 2511(2)(e);
(6) the acquisition of foreign intelligence information, which is governed by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, id. § 2511(2)(f); (7) the intercep-
tion of electronic communications which are readily accessible to the general
public, id. § 2511(2)(g); and (8) the use of a pen register or a trap and trace
device, id. § 2511(2)(h).
8. Act of Oct. 21, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (amend-
ments codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (Supp. IV 1986)) (effective January
20, 1987).
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of technological advances in the field of electronic communications.9
These amendments were also intended to clarify statutory ambiguities
that resulted from judicial interpretations of Title 111.10
Title III was designed to balance the governmental interests of
crime control l I against the need to protect the privacy of individuals
from unauthorized interception of their communications.12 To this end,
Congress included two major exceptions to Title III's general prohibi-
9. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3555 [hereinafter S. REP. 99-541]. As a result of technological
advancements, improved surveillance devices are easily accessible. The use of
computers and new telecommunication systems have led to a revolution in
methods of obtaining information. For a discussion of the technological ad-
vancements requiring an update of Title III, see Landever, Electronic Surveillance,
Computers, and the Fourth Amendment-The New Telecommunications Environment Calls
for Reexamination of Doctrine, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 597 (1984). See also Carr, Privacy
and Electronic Communications under Title III, 14 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. 105,
109 (discussion of amendments of Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 whose principal purpose is response to technological advancements).
10. Carr, supra note 9, at 110 (amendment to § 2511(2)(d) designed to re-
lieve ambiguities caused by judicial interpretation of this section). Other effects
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 are to broaden the scope
of privacy protection under Title III to include private communications carriers,
cellular telephones, electronic mail, computer transmissions and certain types of
radio paging devices. S. REP. 99-54 1, supra note 9. See also Wiley & Liebowitz,
Electronic Privacy Act is Progress-But It Still Is Not a Panacea, NAT'L L.J. Jan. 12,
1987, at 21, 22. Other amendments include legislation enabling law enforce-
ment officials to conduct roving surveillance and execute changes in surveillance
orders. Carr, supra note 9, at 109-10. See alsoJ. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE (2d ed. 1987).
11. Section 801(c) of Title III "recognizes the extensive use made by or-
ganized crime of wire and oral communications." S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong.
2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2177. It also
acknowledges that "the ability to intercept such communications is indispensa-
ble in the evidence gathering process in the administration ofjustice in the area
of organized crime." Id. See also United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 324 (8th
Cir.) (legislation attempted to strike balance between need to protect persons
from unwarranted electronic surveillance and preservation of law enforcement
tools needed to fight organized crime), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
12. Section 801 (b) of Title III recognizes that:
to protect the privacy of wire and oral communications, to protect the
integrity of court and administrative proceedings and to prevent the
obstruction of interstate commerce, it is necessary for Congress to de-
fine on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which
the interception of wire or oral communications may be authorized.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2177.
State courts have also recognized the privacy protection purposes of Title
III. See Halpin v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 885, 495 P.2d 1295, 101 Cal. Rptr.
375 (purpose of Title III is to protect privacy of wire and oral communications
and to establish uniform guidelines for when lawful interceptions can occur),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); State v. DeMartin, 171 Conn. 524, 370 A.2d
1038 (1976) (purpose of section is to protect privacy of oral and wire communi-
cations while establishing uniform basis for valid electronic surveillance); State
v. Howard, 235 Kan. 236, 242, 679 P.2d 197, 201 (1984) (Title III was intended
to serve as guideline, detailing conditions and circumstances requisite for
1989]
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tion against the interception of oral, wire or electronic communications.
These exceptions are: 1) court authorized interceptions 13 and 2) inter-
ceptions when one party to the conversation has given consent to the
interception.' 4 The legality of the one-party consent for private partici-
pation monitoring situations is qualified, however, in that the intercep-
tion is not lawful if intentionally' 5 effected to commit a crime or tort,
proper interception of conversations in which one has protected privacy
interest).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(c) & (d) (Supp. IV 1986). Section 2511(2)(c) al-
lows an exception for persons intercepting their own conversations under color
of law. For the text of and further discussion of this section, see infra note 40
and accompanying text.
Section 2511(2)(d) allows a "private party" one-party consent exception.
This section states:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion where such person is a party to the communication or where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such inter-
ception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
[C]onstitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
The "unless" clause was missing from this section when the bill was first
reported but was added at the urging of Senators Hart and McClellan. United
States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing 114 CONG. REC. 14,695
(1968)). This section was added to prohibit a one-party consent tap where the
monitoring is not conducted under color of law, with an exception for private
persons who act in a defensive fashion. 114 CONG. REC. 14,694 (1968).
Section 2511(2)(d) was amended in 1986 by striking the words "or other
injurious act." For further discussion of this change, see infra notes 64-68 and
accompanying text. This amendment was precipitated by judicial interpretation
of that section which held that the recording of a conversation was illegal if com-
mitted for an "improper purpose," a term which Congress found to be overly
broad and vague. S. REP. 99-541, § 101(b), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3571.
It is not the subject matter of the communication that must be criminal or
tortious for an interception to violate § 251 1(2)(d); rather, it is the purpose be-
hind the interception that determines whether a violation of the section has oc-
curred. United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1131 (4th Cir. 1984).
The result of this exception is the authorization of consensual electronic
surveillance in certain limited circumstances. See, e.g., Moore v. Teflon Commu-
nications Corp., 589 F.2d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 1978) (Title III not intended to
prohibit party from recording conversation with another when recorder was act-
ing out of legitimate desire to protect himself); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d
661 (6th Cir. 1976) (Title III was enacted to curtail electronic surveillance and to
protect privacy of all parties to intercepted conversation); United States v.
Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1976) (purpose of Act "was to allow consensual
interception of telephone conversations without a warrant"), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1091 (1977); In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (purpose of
Title III was to combine "a grant of power to intercept communications with [a]
... set of safeguards to deter abuse"), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
15. It has been held that willfulness is a central element of a violation of
Title III and that civil or criminal liability under that chapter can not be estab-
lished against any defendant without showing that he acted intentionally or with
114 [Vol. 34: p. I111
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such as recording a conversation for purposes of blackmailing the other
party to the communication. 16
An aspect of Title III which has proven troublesome to courts is
section 2515, which requires that evidence obtained in violation of Title
III be suppressed in any criminal or civil trial or hearing. 17 The scope of
this section is a common issue in state' 8 and federal courts.1 9 At issue is
reckless disregard of his legal obligations. Citron v. Citron, 539 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973
(1984). See also United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974) (consent
means actual consent as distinguished from implied consent).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (Supp. IV 1986). See also By-Prod Corp. v.
Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 959-60 (7th Cir. 1982) (purpose of recording
determines whether interception violates Title III; if not for criminal or tortious
purpose, one may intercept phone call to which one is party); United States v.
Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 325 (8th Cir.) (effect of Title III is to prohibit intercep-
tions when done for criminal or tortious purpose, and determination of that pur-
pose is done on case-by-case basis), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); Meredith
v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1971) (permits recording unless purpose
for making is "evil"). Meredith, however, dealt with "injurious acts" which are no
longer grounds for a violation of § 251 l(2)(d). For a further discussion of this
deletion, see infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
For a further analysis of the language and history of the one-party consent
exception, see Note, Does the "One-Party Consent" Exception Effectuate the Underlying
Goals of Title III?, 18 AKRON L. REV. 495 (1985).
Interceptions by a party to the communication will generally be referred to
in this Comment as "participant monitoring" interceptions. For a further dis-
cussion of the "participant monitoring" exception under Title III, see Annota-
tion, Interception of Telecommunication by or with Consent of Party as Exception Under 18
U.S.C.S. § 2511(c) and (d), to Federal Proscription of Such Interceptions, 67 A.L.R. FED.
429 (1984).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982). Section 2515 states in full:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no
part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a state, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclo-
sure of that information would be in violation of [Title III].
Id. This section thus imposes an evidentiary sanction to compel compliance with
other prohibitions of Title III. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
For a discussion of suppression of evidence obtained in violation of Title
III, see infra notes 81-104 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 16.
18. For state cases discussing the scope of Title III, see, e.g., Ex parte
O'Daniel, 515 So. 2d 1250 (Ala. 1987) (relationship of §§ 2515 and 2511(2)(d)
in divorce proceeding); Daniels v. State, 381 So. 2d 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (§§ 2516(2) and 2518(1)(c) preempted state statute authorizing assistant
district attorney to apply for wiretap where district attorney not "principal pros-
ecuting attorney"), afd, 389 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1980); State v. Jock, 404 A.2d 518
(Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (state statute paralleling Title III applies to inter-spousal
communications); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347
(1976) (husband's interception of wife's conversation violated Title III and was
suppressed under § 2515). See generally Note, Wiretapping and the Modern Marriage,
91 DICK. L. REV. 855 (1987) (analysis and additional cases dealing with interpre-
tations of § 2515, particularly as it relates to marital interceptions).
Section 2515, as it is applied to the states, recently withstood a constitu-
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the section's apparently over-broad language which would, if literally in-
terpreted, not permit the government to introduce an illegal recording,
or any evidence obtained through an illegal recording, against any "ag-
grieved person,"'20 including the maker of that recording, for any pur-
tional attack. See Michigan v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Mich. 1987), afd
without opinion, 830 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988). In Meese, the state of Michigan
sought a declaration that § 2515, as applied to the states, violated the tenth
amendment. Id. at 975. The state argued that the Act exceeded the limits of the
Commerce Clause but this claim was dismissed. Id. at 975-76. The section was
found to be necessary and proper to execute Congress' other intentions in Title
III. Id. at 979. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court by holding that there
was no case or controversy to be resolved. 830 F.2d at 692.
19. For federal cases discussing the scope of Title III, see, e.g., United States
v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (illegally intercepted evidence suppressed
under § 2515 when proper motion made under procedural requirement of
§ 2518(10)); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) (grand jury witness
entitled to protection of § 2515 as defense to civil contempt); United States v.
Mora, 821 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1987) (discussion of relationship between §§ 2515
and 2518(10)(a) grounds for suppression); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477
(1st Cir. 1987) (discussion of relationship between §§ 2515 and 2511(2)(d));
United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v.
Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123 (4th Cir. 1984) (same); Anthony v. United States, 667
F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1981) (defendant precluded from using intercepted tapes to
impeach government witness), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982); Hussing v.
Warden, 623 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1980) (violation of § 2515 can be raised in
habeas corpus petition); United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1976)
(discussion of relationship between §§ 2515 and 251 1(2)(d)); United States v.
Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973) (unlawful wiretap evidence allowed for im-
peachment purposes); In re GrandJury Proceedings, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971)
(§ 2515 prevents use of unlawfully recorded evidence to question witness in
grand jury proceeding), ard sub nor. United States v. Egan, 408 U.S. 41 (1972);
United States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (discusses rela-
tionship between §§ 2511(2)(d) and 2515).
For a general discussion of Supreme Court cases addressing Title III, see
Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of Electronic Surveil-
lance, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1983).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (Supp. 1986). This section provides the
mechanism for a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of Title III.
It states that any "aggrieved person may move to suppress the contents of any
intercepted wire, oral or electronic communication ...or evidence derived
therefrom" if the communication is made in violation of Title III. Id. This sec-
tion also outlines the procedure to make the motion. See id. " '[A]ggrieved per-
son' means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic
communication or a person against whom the interception was directed." 18
U.S.C. § 2510(11) (Supp. IV 1986). One must be a victim of a search and
seizure to have standing to suppress illegally obtained evidence. See Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (in order to qualify as person aggrieved
by unlawful search and seizure, one must have been victim of search or seizure-
one against whom search was directed as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through use of evidence gathered as consequence of search or
seizure of another); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 663 (5th Cir. 1976)
("[O]nly those whose rights have been violated should be able to reap the una-
voidable benefits to criminals which accompany the judicial attempt to deter fu-
ture police illegality.") (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). But
see Gelbard'v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) (grand jury witness need not
follow procedure of § 2518(10)(a) to have protection of § 2515).
116 [Vol. 34: p. I111
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pose. 2 1 In spite of the literal language of section 2515, in certain
circumstances courts have interpreted the legislative history to permit
the introduction of evidence which would otherwise be barred.2 2
Two federal courts of appeals have recently adopted different ap-
proaches to suppression of evidence in cases involving privately re-
corded conversations where disclosure is not permitted by a literal
interpretation of the "participant monitoring" exception of section
251 l(2)(d). In United States v. Underhill,23 the Sixth Circuit held that tape
recordings made for a criminal purpose by a private individual were ad-
missible against that individual even though a literal interpretation of
the Act would preclude such admissibility. 24 The First Circuit, however,
in United States v. Vest, 2 5 reached a contrary conclusion regarding the ad-
missibility of tapes when the tapes, which were recorded for an illegal
purpose, were offered as evidence against a third-party victim of the in-
terception. 26 This Comment will examine the reasoning of these cases
and focus on the circumstances which require suppression of evidence
obtained by private party consent interceptions which do not fall within
See generally Note, supra note 5, at 373-80 (discussion of mechanism for
suppression).
21. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-27 (1974). (congressional
intent and policy is key to availability of suppression remedy); United States v.
Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 865 (1st Cir. 1987) (same).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987) (resort to
legislative history enabled introduction of tape recordings against perpetrator of
violation and his confederates); United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.
1976) (illegally made recordings may be used for impeachment purposes);
United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.) (interpretation of "intercept"
does not include police seizure of cassette tapes), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973) (Congress did not
intend Title III to prevent use of unlawfully obtained evidence in impeachment
proceedings); In re Marriage of Lopp, 378 N.E.2d 414 (Ind. 1978) (statutory in-
terpretation allowed use of spousal interception in marital action), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
23. 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987).
24. Id. at 111. In Underhill, the criminal defendant taped conversations with
his co-conspirators regarding an illegal gambling operation. The making of the
tapes violated Tennessee law, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-6-601(7), 39-6-602(e)
(1982), and thereby violated § 2511(2)(d). Id. at 108.
For a further discussion of Underhill, see infra notes 135-51 and accompany-
ing text.
25. 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987).
26. Id. In Vest, the defendant was involved in a criminal transaction. The
other party to the transaction recorded the conversation for the separate crimi-
nal purpose of blackmailing the defendant and later turned the tapes over to the
government who sought to use them in a perjury prosecution. Id. at 479.
The district court in Vest found that the interception was committed in viola-
tion of §§ 2511(1)(a) and (2)(d). 639 F. Supp. 899, 908 (D. Mass. 1986). This
finding was not challenged on appeal to the First Circuit. Vest, 813 F.2d at 480
n.2.
For a further discussion of Vest, see infra notes 105-34 and accompanying
text.
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the exception under section 2511 (2)(d) of the statute because they were
made for an illegal purpose.
In the course of the discussion, the intent of Congress in enacting
sections 251 1(2)(d) and 2515 will be analyzed 2 7 and the courts' role in
interpreting the statute to effectuate the purposes and policies of Con-
gress will be addressed.2 8 In addition, the interaction of sections
2511(2)(d) and 2515 will be examined in light of the overall purposes of
Title 111.29 This Comment will also analyze the similarities and differ-
ences between Vest and Underhill, and will discuss how the decisions of
the First and Sixth Circuits are consistent in light of the intent of Con-
gress. 30 Finally, this Comment will suggest an approach that simplifies
the task of interpreting the statute consistently with the intention of its
drafters.
II. PURPOSES Or TITLE III
Title III was a response to the inherent deficiencies in the Federal
Communications Act of 1934,31 which prohibited the disclosure of pro-
tected communications. Under the previous Act, private citizens were
free to ignore the restrictions set forth in its provisions without appre-
hension of prosecution. 3 2 Furthermore, law enforcement officers could
not use electronic surveillance as an investigative tool, no matter how
27. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 2511(2)(d), see infra notes
57-69 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the legislative history of
§ 2515, see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the role of legislative history in statutory interpreta-
tion, see infra note 131.
29. For a discussion of Congressional intent and purposes in enacting Title
III, see infra notes 34-36 & 57-69 and accompanying text. See also Fishman, The
Interception of Communications Without a Court Order: Title III, Consent, and the Expec-
tation of Privacy, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 41 (1976).
30. For this analysis, see infra notes 152-210 and accompanying text. Both
Underhill and Vest involved § 2515 of Title III as it applies to a violation of
§ 251 l(2)(d) of that chapter. Vest, however, dealt with an innocent third party
victim, whereas Underhill involved an attempt by an intercepting party to sup-
press evidence obtained from his own illegal recordings. See United States v.
Cantley, crim. nos. 86-00293-02 -06 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (1987 WL 13668) (Vest and
Underhill address different aspects of suppression requirement).
31. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (West 1962 & Supp. 1988). The Act provides in part
that:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or assist-
ing in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect, or meaning thereof except through authorized channels of
transmission or reception ....
Id. This section was amended after the enactment of Title III to supply all of the
necessary restrictions on the interception of wire and oral communications not
referred to in the new Act. Id.
32. J. CARR, supra note 10, § 2.1 (private persons were free to ignore restric-
tions because Act only applied to governmental interceptions).
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serious the crime under investigation.33
Title III was designed to provide protection for the privacy of wire
and oral communications and to protect the integrity of court and ad-
ministrative proceedings. 3 4 As noted previously, it was a legislative at-
tempt to strike a balance between the need to protect persons from
unwarranted electronic surveillance and the need for law enforcement
tools necessary in the fight against organized crime.3 5 This balance was
achieved by making the surreptitious monitoring of communications un-
lawful except in certain circumstances.3 6 Thus, in order to protect indi-
viduals from unauthorized interceptions of communications, the
warrantless interception of communications was made a criminal of-
fense3 7 as well as the proper basis for a suit in civil damages.3 8 The
statute also imposed an evidentiary sanction to ensure compliance with
the other provisions of the chapter.3 9
"Participation monitoring" interceptions by a person acting under
color of law are governed by section 2511(2)(c) 40 and court authorized
33. See id. Title III remedied this flaw by specifically identifying which
crimes were subject to surveillance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (Supp. IV 1986).
34. Act ofJune 19, 1968, Pub. L. 90-351 § 80 1(b), 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 237, 253. See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2112, 2177 [hereinafter S. REP. No.
1097]. For a discussion of the purposes of the other Titles under the Omnibus
Crime Control Act, see supra note 4.
35. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 34, at 2153-58; Gelbard v. United States,
408 U.S. 41 (1972) (protection of privacy was overriding Congressional concern
in enactment of Title III, but Act also delineated circumstances under which
interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized); Newcomb v.
Ingle, 827 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1987) (protection of privacy was an overriding
Congressional concern in enacting Title III) (citing Gelbard); United States v.
Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987) (Congress did not intend Title III suppres-
sion sanction to incorporate every change in fourth amendment exclusionary
rule even though protection of privacy was of major concern); United States v.
Underhill, 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1987) (Congress intended to protect innocent
parties to conversation from risk that other party will record and divulge con-
tents; Congress did not intend to protect criminals who recorded their own con-
versations); United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.) (legislation was
intended to balance need to protect individuals from intrusive electronic surveil-
lance and need to preserve law enforcement tools to fight organized crime), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); United States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996 (N.D.
Ohio 1983) (reference to legislative history shows intended balance between
protection of privacy and equipping law enforcement officials with modern
technology).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For further discussion of
this provision, see supra notes 5-7.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. IV 1986).
39. Id. § 2515. For the text of this provision, see supra note 17. For a fur-
ther discussion of § 2515, see infra notes 81-104 and accompanying text.
40. Section 2511(2)(c) states:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under
color of law to intercept a wire, oral or electronic communication,
9
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interceptions are governed by section 2516.41 Because Title III was en-
acted to provide a method by which law enforcement agencies would be
given standards and authority to conduct wiretapping or electronic sur-
veillance, a great deal of cases and scholarly works on Title III have dealt
with these two aspects of the statute.4 2 This Comment, however, will
focus on private interceptions which fall within the ambit of Title III
under section 2511(2)(d).
The suppression rule under Title II143 applies to both private inter-
ceptions which violate section 2511 (2)(d) of the statute as well as to in-
terceptions made for the purpose of law enforcement. 44 Sections 2515
and 251 1(2)(d) 4 5 are not to be considered standing alone, but must be
construed in the context of the entire act and its purposes.4 6 According
to the Supreme Court, a statute should be interpreted in a manner con-
sistent with the congressional purpose.4 7 If the language of section
where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties
to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of interceptions by a
person acting under color of law, see Fishman, supra note 29. See also Annota-
tion, supra note 16. For a discussion of evidence obtained by law enforcement
personnel in violation of Title III, see Note, The Suppression Sanction in the Federal
Electronic Surveillance Statute, 62 WASH. U.L.Q 707 (1984-85).
41. Section 2516 states the criminal activities for which law enforcement
personnel may seek authorization for the interception of wire, oral or electronic
communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). These authori-
zations in turn must be given in conformity with § 2518 of the chapter. Id.
For a discussion of additional situations in which the interception of com-
munications is lawful, see supra note 7.
42. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure-Eavesdropping-Ti-
tle III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968: A Search Without a
Warrant? Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979), 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 308
(1980) (survey of history of eavesdropping law developed by Supreme Court);
Note, Judicial Interpretation of Title Ill-Should Privacy Yield in the Wake of Congres-
sional Silence on Entries to Install Bugs?, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 697 (1980) (advocating
legislative reform of Title III to protect persons from police entry to install
bugs).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982). This provision must be read in light of
§ 2518(10)(a) which defines the class of persons entitled to make a motion to
suppress. Section 2515 prohibits the use of any evidence which was directly or
indirectly obtained in violation of the chapter. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982). For the
full text of § 2515, see supra note 17. For a further discussion of § 2515, see
infra notes 81-104 and accompanying text.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (Supp. IV 1986). For an analysis of the suppres-
sion rule found in § 2515 as it relates to interceptions authorized for law en-
forcement purposes or made under color of law, see Note, supra note 40.
45. For the text of § 251 1(2)(d), see supra note 14. For the text of § 2515,
see supra note 17.
46. United States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (N.D. Ohio 1983); see
also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (discussion of procedure for
obtaining authorization to intercept as it is affected by suppression rule of
§ 2515); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) (discussion of relationship
between different sections of Title III).
47. See generally Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571
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2515 is interpreted literally, any evidence obtained through an intercep-
tion made for an improper purpose is inadmissible in any trial or hear-
ing against any person.4 8 However, such a literal interpretation of the
statute should not be upheld since it leads to an absurd result.49
In response to Title III, state legislatures enacted statutes regulat-
ing electronic surveillance. A few states amended existing laws 50 while
others instituted new legislation following the guidelines of Title III. 5 1
While state laws may be more restrictive than federal laws, they may not
be less so and Title III thus provides the minimum circumstances under
which wire, oral or electronic surveillance or interception is
permissible. 52
(1982) (if literal application of statute would produce result demonstrably at
odds with intention of its drafters, those intentions must control). For a further
discussion of statutory interpretation, see infra notes 131-32 and accompanying
text.
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982).
49. For a further discussion of congressional intent in the enactment of
§ 2515, see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
50. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3010 (1978 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-1162 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 1972); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 179.470 (Michie 1986); N.Y. [CRIM. PROC.] LAw § 700.20 (McKin-
ney 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.724 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.130
(1988).
51. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-15-102(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
41c (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1336(h) (Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-547 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.07 (West 1985); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 803-46 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 18-6706 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-2515 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1308 (West Supp. 1988); MD. [CTs.
& JUD. PROC.] CODE ANN. § 14-408 (1984 & Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626A.06 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-705 (1987); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:7 (1986 & 1988 Supp.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-9
(West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-3 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 176.9 (West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5709 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 12-5.1-2 (1956 & Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-35A-4
(1988); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-23a-10 (1982); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-68 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.30
(West 1985). For a further discussion of the states' ability to regulate electronic
surveillance, see J. CARR, supra note 32, § 2.4.
52. United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 863 n.I I (1st Cir. 1987) (states are
free to impose more rigorous requirements than Title III but may not water
down federally created safeguards); J. CARR, supra note 32, § 2.4(a). See also S.
REP. No. 1097, supra note 34. Evidence obtained by federal authorities in viola-
tion of state law, however, is admissible in federal court. United States v. Keen,
508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
The fourth amendment is limited to governmental searches or violations as
the Constitution only applies to governmental searches and not to private par-
ties. See United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). It has been held that if
evidence falls into government hands following a private search and seizure,
then no constitutional violation arises. United States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp.
996, 999 (N.D. Ohio 1983). Congress is free, however, to provide more protec-
tion than the Constitution requires and Title III provides this protection be-
cause it applies to private parties as well as governmental entities. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
1989]
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Title III's stated purposes are to effectively protect "the privacy of
wire and oral communications, to protect the integrity of court and ad-
ministrative proceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of interstate
commerce . . . . .53 It is mainly designed to safeguard the privacy of
innocent persons. 54 While furthering these goals, Congress sought to
preserve the use of interception of communications as law enforcement
tools needed to fight organized crime. 5 5 However, most of Title III's
provisions are legislative efforts to restrict very narrowly the use of elec-
tronic surveillance in order to safeguard the privacy of individuals. 5 6
A. Section 2511(2)(d)
1. Legislative History
Section 2511(2)(d), as originally enacted, provided an exception to
the general prohibitions of 2511 by allowing a private person who was a
party to a communication to intercept the communication unless the
purpose of the interception was to commit a criminal, tortious or "any
other injurious act."' 57 This section, as well as section 2511(2)(c), re-
placed what was originally proposed as subsection 2(c), which read: "It
shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a party to any wire or oral
communication, or a person given prior authority by a party to the com-
munication to intercept such communication."' 58 The statute was
amended at the urging of Senator Hart who stated that "[section
2511(2)(c) as proposed] is totally permissive with respect to surrepti-
tious monitoring of a conversation even though the monitoring may be
for an insidious purpose such as blackmail, stealing business secrets, or
other criminal or tortious acts in violation of federal or state laws." '59
53. Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 § 801(b), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 237, 253.
For the Legislative history of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, see S. REP. No. 99-541, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3555.
54. See Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 § 801(d).
55. Id. § 801 (c). Section 801 (c) states: Organized criminals make extensive
use of wire and oral communications in their criminal activities. The intercep-
tion of such communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or
to prevent their commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the
administration of justice. Id. See also S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 34.
56. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
301-02 (1972) (Title III authorizes use of electronic surveillance, and much of
Title III was enacted to meet constitutional requirements for electronic surveil-
lance); see also United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 498 (9th Cir.) (Title III pro-
vides "elaborate" and "generally restrictive" detail for permissible wiretaps),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846 (1973); Application of United States, 427 F.2d 639, 643
(9th Cir. 1970) ("meticulous provision[s]" are made regarding electronic sur-
veillance in Title III).
57. For the current text of section 251 1(2)(d) and a discussion of the recent
amendments thereto, see supra note 14.
58. 114 CONG. REC. 14,694 (1968).
59. 114 CONG. REC. 14,694-95 (1968).
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Senator Hart further stated that the use of such outrageous practices
was widespread at the time and that he "believe[d] they constitute a seri-
ous invasion of privacy." '60
The amendments proposed by Senator Hart were adopted without
change in order to fill the perceived "gaping hole" in the statute as orig-
inally proposed. 6 1 Sections 2511(2)(c) and (d) thus allowed one-party
consent taps only when made by a person acting under color of law or
when made by a private person acting in a defensive fashion to protect his
or her own legitimate interests.6 2 Thus, under section 2511(2)(d) as
originally enacted, whenever a private person recorded or otherwise in-
tercepted a communication with an unlawful, tortious or injurious mo-
tive, he violated the criminal provisions of Title III and was also subject
to civil liability for those violations. 63
2. Section 2511(2)(d) as a limit to Section 2515
Section 2511(2)(d) has recently been amended by the striking of the
phrase "or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act."'64
The specific reasoning behind dropping these words from section
2511(2)(d) was that Congress saw courts misconstruing this terminology
to allow civil liability in any case where a party could show any detrimen-
tal effect. 6 5 Particularly troubling to Congress were attempts by parties
to chill the exercise of first amendment rights through the use of civil
remedies under Title 111.66 For example, a zealous reporter or newsman
could be held civilly or criminally liable for exposing the wrongdoing of
a public figure if the embarrassment caused by that exposure could be
interpreted as injurious. 6 7 The remedy Congress chose to alleviate this
60. Id. at 14,694.
61. Id.
62. Id. See also Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794, 798 (8th Cir. 1971) (pur-
pose of amendment is to bring one party consent interceptions which were made
with "evil" purpose within prohibitions of Title III). Section 2511(2)(c), an-
other participant monitoring exception, allows one-party consent taps which in-
volve law enforcement officials. For the text of this provision, see supra note 40.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of private actions
under Title III, see Englander, Statutes of Limitations and Private Actions Under Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
614 (1984).
64. Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520
(Supp. IV 1986)). For the text of amended § 2511(2)(d), see supra note 14.
65. See S. REP. No. 99-541, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3555, 3571.
66. Id.
67. This was the situation presented in Boddie v. American Broadcasting
Co., 731 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1984), which Congress specifically referred to as an
example of an attempt to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights. In Boddie,
the plaintiff, whose conversations were recorded by a journalist, sued for dam-
ages that resulted from that recording. 731 F.2d at 335. The plaintiff claimed
that the defendants' purpose in recording the conversation was to cause her "in-
sult and injury." Id. at 338. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case for a factual
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perceived problem was to limit the situations where a one-party consent
interception constitutes a violation of Title 111.68 With the impact of
section 2511(2)(d) lessened, the impact of the Title III "suppression"
section, section 2515, is also indirectly limited. 69 Similarly, decisions
under section 251 1(2)(d) which place the burden of establishing that a
recording was made for an improper purpose on the defendant in a sup-
pression motion can be seen as indirectly limiting section 2515.
In United States v. Phillips,70 a defendant was convicted of perjury
over his motion to suppress tapes of conversations in which he was a
participant. 7' The defendant argued that the government held the ulti-
mate burden of proving that the conversations were not recorded for an
improper purpose, and since no evidence was offered on this issue at
trial, the tapes should have been suppressed. 72
The Eighth Circuit held that the burden of proof to show that a
recording was made for an improper purpose under section 2511(2)(d)
was on the party seeking to suppress the recording under section
2515. 73 The court found that the legislative history behind sections
2511(2)(d) and 2515 reflected no desire on the part of Congress to
change the traditional burden of proof, which places the burden on the
suppressing party, with regard to electronically gathered evidence under
determination as to whether the defendant intended injury to Boddie, or
whether the defendant acted in good faith. Id. Congress felt that interpreting
§ 2511(2)(d) as imposing liability in this situation would place a "stumbling
block in the path of even the most scrupulous journalist." S. REP. No. 99-541,
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3555, 3571. For a further
discussion of the decision in Boddie, see Note, supra note 16, at 511-14; Annota-
tion, supra note 16.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (Supp. IV 1986). For the text of§ 2511(2)(d)as
amended, see supra note 14.
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982). Because it is no longer a violation of Title
III for a private person who is a party to a communication to intercept that com-
munication for an injurious purpose which is neither criminal nor tortious, there
will be fewer situations when suppression is required under § 2515 and thus the
impact of that section is necessarily reduced.
70. 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
71. Id. at 323-24. The defendant, Phillips, denied before a grand jury in-
vestigating a conspiracy that he had ever stated to anyone that he could arrange
protection from local law enforcement officials. Id. at 323. On the basis of these
statements, he was prosecuted for knowingly making false statements before a
grand jury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. Id. The critical evidence admitted
at trial was a tape recorded meeting attended by Phillips in which Phillips stated
that he could control the district attorney. Id. at 324. The purpose of the re-
cording of the conversation was unknown. Id. The defendant moved to sup-
press this evidence under § 2515 as, he alleged, it was obtained in violation of
§ 2511(2)(d). Id. This motion was denied and Phillips was convicted. Id.
72. Id. at 324.
73. Id. at 325. The Phillips court found that due process was not offended
by requiring the defendant to shoulder the burden of establishing that the re-
cording was made for an improper purpose because the purpose of the record-
ing had no relationship to the perjury with which the defendant was charged. Id.
at 326.
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Title III.74 Similar holdings have been made by other federal courts
prior to the Phillips decision. 7 5 This may signal a further intent to use
the provisions of section 2511(2)(d) to limit the suppression of evidence
under section 2515.76
3. Summary of Section 2511(2)(d)
Under section 251 l(2)(d) as it now stands, a violation may be sup-
ported upon proof that the person making the recording did so for the
purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act. 77 The burden is on
the party alleging such a violation to prove the criminal or tortious act.
If this burden is met, the recording/interception violates Title III and
the criminal7 8 and civil 79 remedies under that chapter will apply. Addi-
tionally, suppression of evidence is available for evidence unlawfully ob-
tained under Title III if a violation of section 2511(2)(d) is shown.80
However, court-imposed and statutory limitations on proving section
2511 (2)(d) "violations" indirectly limit the impact of section 2515.
74. Id. at 324 (citing S. REP. No. 1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2153-58).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1131-32 (4th Cir.)
(defendant must establish that recording was made for criminal or tortious act),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1984); United States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996,
1000 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (burden on defendant to show impermissible purpose of
recording); Consumer Elec. Prod. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1194, 1196
(D. Colo. 1983) (burden of proof is on asserting party on issue of whether one
party exception to Title III is negated on ground that interception was made for
purpose of committing criminal or tortious act).
76. If the burden were on the party seeking to admit the evidence to prove
that it was not obtained for a criminal or tortious purpose, suppression would
necessarily be easier to obtain under § 2515.
Further § 2515 is not self executing. Instead, § 2518(10)(a) provides that
any aggrieved person may file a motion to suppress the contents of any unlaw-
fully intercepted communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1982). This section
provides the remedy for the right created by § 2515. S. REP. No. 90-1097, supra
note 34. See Phillips, 540 F.2d at 325 (§ 2518(10)(a) provides remedy for right
created by § 2515). But see Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1972)
(§ 2518(10)(a) authorizes any aggrieved person in specified types of proceed-
ings to move to suppress contents of any intercepted wire or oral communica-
tion or evidence derived therefrom but it does not follow from omission of
grand jury proceedings from the suppression provision that grand jury witnesses
cannot invoke § 2515 as a defense in contempt proceedings).
Additionally, under traditional search and seizure law, the burden is on the
accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire-
tapping was unlawfully employed. Phillips, 540 F.2d at 325 (citing Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)).
77. See By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956, 959 (7th Cir.
1982) (it is use of interception with intent to harm, rather than fact of intercep-
tion of a telecommunication that is critical to liability under § 2511 (2)(d)).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
79. Id. § 2520.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982). For a further discussion of § 2515, see infra
notes 81-104 and accompanying text.
19891
15
Smith: The Suppression Sanction under the Electronic Communications Priv
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
126 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34: p. 111
B. Section 2515
As previously noted, section 2515 imposes an evidentiary sanction
to compel compliance with other prohibitions of the chapter.8 1 In en-
acting this section, however, Congress did not intend to expand the
scope of the suppression sanction beyond the then existing search and
seizure law. 82 However, while "Title III's suppression remedy has its
roots in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, it is not simply coex-
tensive with that rule."'8 3 In United States v. Gelbard,84 the Supreme
Court, after surveying the legislative history of Title 111,85 emphasized
that section 2515, besides protecting the privacy of communications, en-
sures that courts do not become parties to illegal conduct. 86 The Court
stated that the disclosure or use of information obtained through an in-
vasion of privacy under Title III amounts to a separate injury to the vic-
8 1. Id. For the text of § 2515, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
The Senate Report on § 2515 states:
Section 2515 of [Title III] imposes an evidentiary sanction to compel
compliance with the other provisions of the chapter .... The provision
must, of course, be read in light of section 2518(10)(a) .. .which de-
fines the class entitled to make a motion to suppress. It largely reflects
existing law. It applies to suppress evidence directly (Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937)) or indirectly obtained in violation
of the chapter. (Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)). There
is, however, no intention to change the attenuation rule. Nor generally
to press the scope of the suppression rule beyond present search and
seizure law. But it does apply across the board to both Federal and
State proceedings. And it is not limited to criminal proceedings. Such
a suppression rule is necessary and proper to protect privacy. The pro-
vision thus forms an integral part of the system of limitations designed
to protect privacy. Along with the criminal and civil remedies, it should
serve to guarantee that the standards of [Title III] will sharply curtail
the unlawful interception of wire and oral communications.
S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 34 (citations omitted).
82. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 34. See also United States v. Dorfman, 690
F.2d 1217, 1227 (7th Cir. 1982) (legislative history of Title III indicates that
statutory suppression was meant largely to reflect existing law); S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 34 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)).
83. United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1217, 1227 (7th Cir. 1982). The
Dorfman court noted that the significant difference between Title III suppression
and the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is that the former bars use of ille-
gally seized evidence in any trial or hearing, not just criminal trials. Id. at 1227.
According to the Dorman court, a second difference relates to the scope of the
respective purposes of Title III and the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
The court stated: "[U]nder Title III, unlike the fourth amendment, the invasion
of privacy is not simply 'over and done with' when an unlawful intrusion has
been effected. Rather, the disclosure or use of information obtained through
such an intrusion amounts to a separate injury to the victim's privacy interest."
Id. at 1228 (citing Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1972)).
84. 408 U.S. 41 (1972). For a further discussion of the facts and holding in
Gelbard, see infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
85. 408 U.S. at 46-50.
86. Id. at 51.
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tim's privacy interest.8 7
Section 2515 does not prohibit the use of illegally recorded commu-
nications for impeachment purposes. 8 8 The Title III exclusionary rule
is thus similar to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in this re-
spect. 89 In United States v. Raftery,90 the Ninth Circuit found, in a perjury
prosecution case, that under the fourth amendment the government was
not precluded from using evidence which had been illegally obtained in
a prior investigation to prove the separate offense of perjury where the
alleged perjury took place after the illegal search and seizure and after
the evidence had previously been suppressed by the state court.9 1 Raf-
tery was not a Title III case; rather it was a fourth amendment case
wherein the court held that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
should not be extended to prevent a conviction for perjury occurring
after the illegal seizure had taken place. 92 The court stated that there is
no justification for allowing a defendant to "affirmatively resort to per-
jurious testimony in reliance on the government's disability to challenge
the credibility of an issue."' 93 The court also addressed the deterrent
purpose behind the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.94 While Raf-
tery did not address the Title III exclusionary sanction, its rationale is
useful in examining the application of that rule. The Raftery decision
supports the proposition that suppression is intended to rectify the
wrong of the illegal search or interception; it does not grant the injured
party a substantive right of immunity from prosecution for a wrongful
act.
87. Id. at 51-52.
88. United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973) (evidence ob-
tained by unlawful wiretap may be used to impeach witness that testifies on di-
rect examination with regard to testimony of defendant). See also United States
v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 484 (1st Cir. 1987) (exception to § 2515 allowing unlaw-
fully intercepted communications for impeachment purposes does not support
exception for use of those communications in perjury prosecutions); S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 34, at 2184-85 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954)). For a further discussion of the use of illegally obtained evidence for
impeachment purposes, see infra note 116.
89. Caron, 474 F.2d at 506. In Caron, the Fifth Circuit found that, as with
the fourth amendment, unlawfully intercepted communications may be used for
impeachment purposes. Id. at 508-09 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62 (1954)).
90. 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
91. Id. at 857.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954)).
94. Id. The court noted that the deterrent effect of excluding the evidence
resulting from an illegal search would be minimal if the government was pre-
vented from using the evidence to prove a separate offense after the illegal
search and seizure and suppression of the evidence in the state court. Id. Title
III was not intended to extend the scope of the judicially created suppression
rule and therefore the limits imposed on that rule are relevant in interpreting
the meaning of Title III. For a discussion of Congressional intent with respect
to the scope of Title III, see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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The fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to non-
governmental searches, 9 5 but the suppression rule of Title III does.9 6
Title III, while similar to fourth amendment suppression in the actual
suppression rights afforded, therefore covers a broader scope of
searches than is covered by the fourth amendment.
9 7
An example of the broad scope of section 2515 is found in United
States v. Gelbard98 in which section 2515 protection was extended to a
grand jury witness. 9 9 In Gelbard, the Supreme Court held that when a
grand jury witness is adjudicated in contempt for refusing to testify, he
may invoke the protection of section 2515 as a defense.' 0 0 The Court
recognized that the perpetrator of the invasion must be denied the fruits
of his unlawful actions and that Title III's importance as a protection for
the victim of an unlawful invasion of privacy is central to the legislative
scheme.' 0 ' Thus, the Court held that the purpose of section 2515, and
Title III as a whole, would be subverted if a grandjury witness was not
able to invoke section 2515 protections under these circumstances. 0 2
95. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (private carrier opening
and examining package does not violate fourth amendment and government's
invasion of privacy is tested by degree to which it exceeds scope of private
search); Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 879 (10th Cir. 1981) (fourth
amendment search and seizure rules apply to governmental searches not those
of private individuals), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982).
96. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n.22 (1977) (availability of
suppression for statutory, as opposed to constitutional, violations turns on pro-
visions of Title III rather than judicially fashioned exclusionary rule); Anthony v.
United States, 667 F.2d 870, 878 (10th Cir. 1981) (Title III applies to tapping by
private individuals as well as illegal court-authorized wiretaps), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1133 (1982). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
97. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). The Calandra
court stated that "[tihe purpose of the [fourth amendment] exclusionary rule is
not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim .... " Id. The
Calandra court further stated that the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary rule
is to deter future police conduct and thereby protect fourth amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.
The Title III suppression rule, however, has an added purpose: the protec-
tion of privacy. Thus, different interests are implicated by a violation of Title
III. For a discussion of these additional privacy interests, see supra notes 12 &
35 and accompanying text.
98. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
99. In Gelbard, the petitioners were adjudicated in civil contempt of court
for refusing to comply with a court order to testify. Id. at 42-43. The witnesses
refused to testify on the grounds that the questioning was based upon informa-
tion obtained from the witnesses' communications, allegedly intercepted by fed-
eral agents in violation of Title III. Id. at 43. The question before the Court was
whether the witnesses were entitled to invoke § 2515 prohibitions as a defense
to the contempt charge. Id.
100. Id. at 47, 61.
101. Id. at 50.
102. Id. at 51.
Despite the seemingly broad scope of § 2515, the Supreme Court has held
that not every violation of Title III requires suppression of the intercepted con-
versation. Id. at 51-52. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974)
[Vol. 34: p. I111
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Many of the cases involving suppression under section 2515 con-
cern the failure of law enforcement officials to satisfy a series of pre-
scribed procedural requirements when applying for and executing
surveillance warrants, and judges' failures to make certain required find-
ings before issuing such warrants. 103 However, suppression of evidence
obtained in violation of Title III is also required when a private person
has committed an interception in violation of section 2511(2)(d). 10 4
The following two sections will discuss two circuit court decisions that
have addressed the question of suppression in the context of a
2511(2)(d) violation in different factual settings.
III. SUPPRESSION BY VICTIM OF INTERCEPTION
In United States v. Vest,' 0 5 the defendant and Francis Tarantino
agreed to "fix" the sentencing of Jesse Waters, who was charged with
various offenses stemming from the shooting of Tarantino. The scheme
required Waters to pay Tarantino a total of $300,000. The defendant,
Vest, was used as a conduit for these payments.' 0 6 Vest met with Wa-
ters and Waters gave him $35,000 to be delivered to Tarantino. With-
out Vest's knowledge, Waters recorded the transaction and
(suppression inappropriate for violations of sections which were not intended to
serve "substantive" role); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (viola-
tion of procedure occupying "central role" in the statutory scheme warrants
suppression of intercepted communications).
For a discussion of the violations which do not warrant suppression, see
Note, supra note 40. Cf J. CARR, supra note 10, at 354-55 (availability of suppres-
sion determined by analyzing Chavez and Giordano).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) & (2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (detailing re-
quired contents of application to a authority for approving interception of com-
munication); Id. § 2518(3) (specifying findings judge must make before issuing
search warrant); Id. § 2518(4) (specifying content of surveillance order); Id.
§ 2516 (delineating procedures for judicial approval of applications for elec-
tronic surveillance). For a discussion of cases that have addressed the issue of
when suppression is required for failure to meet these requirements, see Note,
supra note 40.
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(d), 2515 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For the text
of these sections, see supra notes 14 & 17 and accompanying text. Cases finding
a criminal or tortious purpose behind the recording include: Simpson v. Simp-
son, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 493 F.2d 664, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.
Underhill, 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1987).
For examples of cases finding that a criminal or tortious (or other injurious)
purpose was not shown, see United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 100 (1976); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123 (4th
Cir. 1984); By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry Co., 668 F.2d 956 (7th Cir. 1982);
Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1971); Woodson v. State, 579 S.W.2d
893 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Strohl, 57 Cal. App. 3d 347, 129 Cal. Rptr.
224 (1976).
105. 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987).
106. Id. at 479.
1989]
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accompanying discussion. 10 7 Waters later turned the tape over to fed-
eral law enforcement officers who began an investigation of the payoff
scheme. 108
Vest testified before a grand jury that he had not participated in
Waters' payment of money to Tarantino. At this point, the tape record-
ing of his conversation with Waters was played. 10 9 On the basis of these
statements, the grand jury indicted Vest on three counts of making false
declarations before a grand jury.' 10
Prior to trial, Vest moved to suppress the tape arguing that Waters
had made the tape in violation of section 2511 (1) (a) of Title III I'I and
that the recording fell outside of the exception of section 2511 (2) (d). 112
Vest therefore argued that introduction of the tape into evidence would
violate section 2515 of that chapter.' 13
The district court found that Waters' recording of the conversation
was made for a criminal purpose."14 The district court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that tape recordings made for the purpose of fur-
thering illegal activities were admissible in a perjury prosecution.' 15
However, the court held that the tapes could be used for impeachment
107. Id. According to Waters' testimony at the suppression hearing, his
reason for making the recording was to create a "receipt" in case Tarantino later
claimed that Waters had failed to make the payment. Id. at 479.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Making false declarations before a grand jury is a criminal offense
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982).
111. 813 F.2d at 479. Section 2511 (l)(a) provides: "Except as otherwise
specifically provided in this chapter any person who ... willfully intercepts, en-
deavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire or oral communication . . . shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(a)
(1982).
The current version of § 2511 (1) (a) also prohibits the interception of elec-
tronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
112. 813 F.2d at 479. For the text of § 2511(2)(d), see supra note 14.
113. 813 F.2d at 479. For the text of§ 2515, see supra note 17.
114. 639 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass. 1986). The district court concluded that
§ 2511(2)(d) forbids the recording of communications between private persons
by or with the consent of one of the parties when it is shown that either: (1) the
primary motivation; or (2) a determinative factor in the actor's motivation for
intercepting the conversation was to commit a criminal, tortious, or other injuri-
ous act. Id. at 904. It should be noted that "or other injurious act" is no longer
a violation of the act. For a discussion of the reasons why Congress chose to
delete this phrase, see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
The court further found that the "receipt" motive presented by Waters en-
compassed the impermissible purpose of acting in furtherance of a criminal con-
spiracy in that Waters hoped to cause Tarantino to perform his function in the
alleged conspiracy by use of the recordings. Id. at 907. The issue as to the
illegal purpose behind the recording was not addressed on appeal to the First
Circuit.
115. Id. at 912.
130
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purposes. 116
The issues on appeal in Vest were: 1) whether there was an excep-
tion to section 2515 for an illegally intercepted communication which
falls into the hands of the government as an "innocent recipient" after a
private search," 17 and 2) whether there was an exception permitting the
use of illegally intercepted communications in a perjury prosecution." 8
The First Circuit answered both questions in the negative, holding that
courts in general do not have authority to create exceptions to section
2515' 19 and that there is no indication of congressional intent to permit
the use of unlawfully intercepted communications in perjury
prosecutions. 120
As to the first issue, the court noted that section 2515 was not only
aimed at deterring violations of Title III's other provisions but was also
aimed at protecting privacy.' 2 1 The court stated that section 2515's
"importance as a protection for 'the victim of an unlawful invasion of
privacy' could not be more clear."' 12 2 According to the court, the pro-
tection of privacy from invasion by illegal private interception as well as
116. Id. at 911-12. This use has been allowed as an exception to Title III by
other courts. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1981)
(court authorized wiretap which violates Title III may be used on cross-examina-
tion for impeachment purposes), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983); United States
v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973) (unlawful wiretap may be used to im-
peach defendant in perjury trial).
For examples of cases not involving Title III where illegally seized evidence
has been allowed for impeachment purposes, see United States v. Havens, 446
U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally seized t-shirt may be used to impeach defendant on
cross-examination); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements obtained
in violation of Miranda warnings, not admissible in government's case-in-chief,
are admissible for impeachment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (197 1) (de-
fendant's statements are admissible for impeachment even though obtained in
violation of Miranda); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (once defend-
ant asserts on direct that he never possessed narcotics, door left open to intro-
duce illegally seized evidence for impeachment purposes).
117. Vest, 813 F.2d at 480. See also United States v. Shearson Lehman Bros.,
650 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (tape recordings of conversations made by
defendants as part of illegal gambling operations which were subsequently ob-
tained by government under valid search warrant were not acquired in violation
of Title III); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1973) (where
communications unlawfully intercepted not by government but by defendants
and where disclosure came only as result of prosecution of defendants, disclo-
sure of contents of intercepted communications not prohibited under Title III).
118. Vest, 813 F.2d at 480. See also United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319
(8th Cir.) (illegal tape recording of conversation not independently admissible in
perjury prosecution merely because government had no part in that recording),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976). For a further discussion of cases that have
decided this issue, see supra notes 88-89.
119. Vest, 813 F.2d at 482-84.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 483.
122. Id. at 481 (quoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 50 (1972)
(quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1968))).
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unauthorized governmental interception plainly "play[s] a central role
in the statutory scheme .... ,,123 The court, referring to the purpose
behind Title III, found that even where the government is the innocent
recipient of a recording which was illegally intercepted, that recording
should be suppressed; allowing its introduction would compound the
invasion of the privacy of the victim. 1 24 The court noted that Vest was
the innocent victim of the illegal recording; introducing it as evidence
would violate his privacy regardless of the fact that the government did
not participate in that recording. 125 Thus, the court declined to read
into section 2515 an exception permitting the introduction of a commu-
nication intercepted in violation of Title III by an "innocent recipient"
of the communication. 12
6
The First Circuit also affirmed the decision of the district court 12 7 in
holding that neither the text nor the legislative history of section 2515
support an exception to the Title III exclusionary rule for perjury prose-
cutions.' 28 The First Circuit recognized that "Congress intended to
strike a balance between the twin purposes of protecting privacy and
recognizing the importance and legality of intercepting communications
for the purpose of combatting crime."' 129 The court refused to upset
this balance by creating a judicial exception to section 2515.130
123. Vest, 813 F.2d at 481 (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S.
505, 528 (1974)).
124. Id.
125. Id. The court stated: "The impact of this second invasion is not less-
ened by the circumstance that the disclosing party (here the government) is
merely the innocent recipient of a communication illegally intercepted by the
guilty interceptor (here, Waters)." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 484.
128. Id. See United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 912 (D. Mass. 1986).
The district court had also found that Title III permits the government to use
the illegally recorded tape for impeachment purposes. Id. at 911. For a list of
cases where courts have reached the same conclusion, see supra note 116.
Many courts have interpreted the legislative history of Title III to allow ex-
ceptions for the use of illegally made recordings for impeachment purposes
while not allowing them for perjury prosecutions. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note
34, at 96.
The First Circuit in Vest recognized that Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62 (1954) provided an exception to the suppression rule for the use of unlaw-
fully seized evidence for impeachment purposes but that nothing in the statute
dealt with perjury prosecutions. Furthermore, fourth amendment suppression
requirements did not extend to perjury prosecutions in 1968 when Title III was
enacted. The court stated: "[W]e note that Congress, acting in 1968, specified
its intent not to press the scope of the suppression rule . . . beyond present
search and seizure law." Vest, 813 F.2d at 482.
For a further discussion of Walder, see infra notes 158-62 and accompanying
text.
129. Vest, 813 F.2d at 483.
130. Id. at 481-83. Other federal courts have reached the same result. See
United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir.) (no exception under section
2515 for use of illegally intercepted communications in perjury prosecution),
[Vol. 34: p. I111
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The First Circuit in Vest recognized the government's theory of stat-
utory interpretation: where the plain meaning is disclosed by reading
the text of the statute and application of that meaning does not produce
results that are absurd or at variance with the policy of the enactment as
a whole, the inquiry ends. 13 1 The government argued that a literal read-
ing is inappropriate where the result would be plainly at variance with
the policy of the legislation as a whole stating, as an example, that Con-
gress could not have intended to forbid the use of an illegal recording
under section 2511 in a prosecution against the maker of that record-
ing. 13 2 However, the court stated that section 2515 has a dual pur-
pose-the deterrence of Title III violations and the protection of
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1973) (same). Buf cf. United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.) (govern-
ment not precluded under fourth amendment from using illegally intercepted
evidence before grand jury in perjury prosecution where perjury occurred after
illegal search and seizure and after evidence had been suppressed by state
court), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976).
The First Circuit also rejected the conclusion reached in United States v.
Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996, 1001-02 (N.D. Ohio 1983), that "§ 251 l(2)(d) does
not operate to ban the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications where
the communications were made to further 'illegal activities.' " Vest, 813 F.2d at
483 n.4. For further discussion of the Traficant decision, see infra notes 165-76
and accompanying text.
131. 813 F.2d at 480. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,
571 (1982) (in rare cases, literal application of statute will produce results de-
monstrably at odds with intention of drafters and those intentions control);
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (when
acceptance of literal meaning of statute leads to results which are "absurd or
futile" or plainly at odds with the policy of the legislation, then congressional
purpose will be followed).
The Supreme Court in Griffin did not find that a literal interpretation of the
statute in question, 46 U.S.C. § 596, would thwart its obvious purpose or pro-
duce an absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended. 458
U.S. at 571. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion disagreed, stating, "the will of
the legislature is not reflected in a literal reading of the words it has chosen." Id.
at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers.... This is not the substitution of the will of
the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general
meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in
question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the cir-
cumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which
follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unrea-
sonable to believe that the legislature intended to include the particular
act.
Griffin, 458 U.S. at 577-78 n.l (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Holy Trinity'
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). The courts' role in statu-
tory interpretation is thus one of following the intent of the drafters.
132. Vest, 813 F.2d at 480. See S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 34, at 99-100
(disclosure of illegally intercepted communications may be authorized in prose-
cution of violator of Title III); see also United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 217,
221 (D.D.C. 1973) (paradox results when persons who violated statute by inter-
cepting communications are immune to prosecution because statute prohibits
1989]
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privacy. 13 3 Thus, exclusion of the illegally-obtained recording in order
to protect Vest's privacy was not an absurd result. 134
IV. SUPPRESSION BY PERPETRATOR OF INTERCEPTION
In United States v. Underhill,'3 5 the criminal defendants recorded
conversations involving gambling information while operating an illegal
gambling business. 136 The recording of these conversations violated
federal and state law.' 3 7 The federal government lawfully seized the
tapes and offered them into evidence against the defendants who made
them and against their co-conspirators in a trial for conspiracy and for
substantive gambling offenses.' 38 The defendants moved to suppress
the tapes on the basis of the general prohibition of section 2515 against
the use of illegally intercepted communications. 139 The defendants also
argued that the situation did not fall within the exception of section
2511 (2)(d).140
The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee granted
the defendants' motions to suppress the tapes on the ground that they
disclosure of evidence of intercepted communications). Cf. United States v. Un-
derhill, 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987).
133. Vest, 813 F.2d at 480-81.
134. Id. at 481.
135. 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2484 (1987).
136. Id. at 107.
137. Id. at 108, 111. The court noted that taping the conversations consti-
tuted the making of a "gambling record" as defined by TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-
601(7) (1982), in violation of TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-602(e) (1982 & Supp.
1987), which makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly make, possess, or store a
gambling record. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111. Furthermore, the recordings vio-
lated 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) which makes it a crime to carry
on a gambling business in violation of the law of the state in which it is con-
ducted. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 108.
138. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 107.
139. Id. at 107-08. The general prohibition against the admission into evi-
dence of illegally intercepted wire and oral communications is contained in 18
U.S.C. § 2515 (1982). For the text of § 2515, see supra note 17.
140. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 107-08. For the text of § 2511(2)(d), see supra
note 14. This was the "only exception which could render the tapes legal and
therefore admissible." Id. at 107.
The defendants were in the unique position of having to argue that the
tapes they recorded were made for an illegal purpose under § 2511(2)(d). The
government argued that the tapes were made "merely to preserve an accurate
record of their transactions to prevent later distortions by the other parties to
the conversations" and that this defensive act was not "for the purpose of com-
mitting any criminal or tortious act" under § 2511(2)(d). Id. at 109-10. If this
were true, the interception would have fallen within the exception and would
not have been subject in any case to the suppression requirements of § 2515.
The Sixth Circuit held that the tapes were made for the purpose of making a
"gambling record," a misdemeanor under TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-601(7)
(1982) and 39-6-602(e) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Id. at 111. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the communications were intercepted for the purpose of committing
a criminal act. Id.
[Vol. 34: p. I111
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were recordings of telephone conversations that had been illegally inter-
cepted. 14 1 The issue on appeal was whether a defendant who makes a
recording for a criminal purpose is entitled to have that recording sup-
pressed as illegal evidence under Title 111.142 The Sixth Circuit ana-
lyzed the legislative history of Title II1 43 and found that Congress did
not intend to deprive prosecutors of evidence recorded in contravention
of the Act.1 44 The court stated that Congress did not intend section
2515 to "shield" the very people who committed the unlawful intercep-
tions from the consequences of their wrongdoing. 14 5 The government
argued, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, that in the case at hand, suppres-
sion would not fulfill the purpose of the statute and it would be a "per-
version of the Act" to permit criminals to benefit from violating the
Act. ' 4 6
The court of appeals stated that congressional intent controls the
interpretation of a statute if "the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its draft-
ers . . . "147 The court noted that an absurd situation would result if a
defendant were allowed to suppress tape recordings which he had made
in furtherance of an illegal act. 148 Nevertheless, the district court had
found the language of the statute unambiguous and granted the defend-
ant's motion to suppress. 14 9
The Sixth Circuit concluded that when the literal meaning of a stat-
ute produces unreasonable results "plainly at variance with the policy of
the legislation as a whole," the court may follow the purpose of the stat-
ute rather than the literal words. 150 The court stated that a literal appli-
cation of the language of Title III to the makers of the illegal recordings
would produce an absurd result that Congress could not have
intended. ' 5 1
141. See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 107-08.
142. Id. at 107.
143. The Sixth Circuit noted Senator Hart's comments on the exception as
originally proposed. For further discussion of these comments, see supra notes
59-62 and accompanying text. The court noted: "The entire focus of Senator
Hart's comments was on protecting an innocent party from injury or embarrass-
ment." Underhill, 813 F.2d at 110.
144. Id. at 112.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 109.
147. Id. at 111 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,
571 (1982)).
148. Id. at 108, 111.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 111 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Assocs., Inc.,
310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (quoting Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194
(1922))).
151. Id. at 112. A literal interpretation of §§ 2511(2)(d) and 2515 would
enable defendants to suppress evidence of their own wrongdoing and thus
shield themselves from the consequences of their acts. Id.
1989]
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V. ANALYSIS
A literal interpretation of section 2515 would require suppression
of any evidence obtained through an illegal interception regardless of
who made the interception or whom it was to be used against,' 52 pro-
vided that the defendant had followed the proper procedures to obtain
that suppression. 153 By examining legislative history, however, courts
have found exceptions to the broad suppression requirement.' 54 In
United States v. Caron, 155 for example, the Fifth Circuit, quoting the Sen-
ate Report on section 2515, allowed the use of illegally intercepted com-
munications for the purpose of impeachment. 15 6 This Report stated
that there was no intention to "press the scope of the suppression rule
beyond present search and seizure law."' 5 7 The Senate Report cited
Walder v. United States158 as an example of the fourth amendment sup-
pression/exclusionary rule. 159
The court further held that a confederate of the perpetrator, as a member of
the conspiracy that effected the interception, was bound by the acts of his co-
conspirators and thereby "waived" his right of privacy in communications which
were made in furtherance of the purposes of the conspiracy. Id.
The Sixth Circuit noted that all of the appellees were charged with conspir-
acy and were in fact members of a conspiracy. The court stated: "As a member
of the conspiracy [a co-conspirator who did not participate in the actual record-
ing]... may be held to have waived his right of privacy in communications made
in furtherance of the purposes of the conspiracy." Id. (citing Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946)); United States v. Bowers, 739 F.2d 1050
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 861 (1984)).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982). For the text of § 2515, see supra note 17.
153. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) defines who has standing to seek suppression
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(i). For the text of §§ 2510(11) and
2518(10)(a)(i), see supra note 20.
154. For example, courts have found a 'marital exception' to the require-
ment of suppression when one spouse records the other's conversation without
first obtaining consent. In re Marriage of Lopp, 268 Ind. 690, 704, 378 N.E.2d
414, 421 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979) (wiretapped conversations of
spouse admissible in marital action because literal application of § 2515 in this
situation would lead to illogical and absurd result).
Courts have also found a 'marital exception' to the general prohibitions
against interceptions of communications under Title III. See Simpson v. Simp-
son, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.) (Title III does not apply to spouse recording
other spouse's conversation within marital home because Congress did not in-
tend to extend Act to marital conflicts), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); Contra
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 673 (6th Cir. 1976) (no marital exception
under Title III when tap occurs after one party to marriage has left marital
home); Pulawski v. Blais, 506 A.2d 76, 77 n.2 (R.I. 1986) (no marital exception
under Title III). For a further discussion of the marital exception under Title
III, see Note, Wiretapping and the Modern Marriage, 91 DICK. L. REV. 855 (1987).
155. 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973).
156. Id. at 509-10.
157. Id. at 509 (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2112, 2185).
158. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
159. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 34.
136 [Vol. 34: p. I111
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In Walder, a pre-Title III case, the testimony of an officer who had
participated in an illegal search and seizure was allowed solely for im-
peachment purposes, and the defendant was found to have opened the
door to the use of that illegally obtained evidence by testifying on direct
examination. 160 The Supreme Court stated:
It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an af-
firmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite an-
other to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by
which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained
to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against
contradiction of his untruths.16 1
The Court further stated: "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the
defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the
Government's disability to challenge his credibility."' 16 2
In Caron, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the holding of Walder in conjunc-
tion with the legislative history of section 2515 and held that evidence
obtained in violation of Title III could be used for impeachment pur-
poses since the defendant testified on direct examination. 163
The importance of this reasoning is underscored by the decision
reached by the Sixth Circuit in Underhill. While Underhill does not in-
volve the issue of impeachment, an examination of the analysis used in
Walder and Caron to find that the use of illegally intercepted evidence is
admissible for impeachment purposes is helpful in justifying the deci-
sion in Underhill. The defendant in Underhill, like the defendants in
Walder and Caron, indirectly attempted to take advantage of the illegality
of his own act to shield himself from the government's use of that ille-
gally intercepted evidence against him. Because the seizure of the tapes
in Underhill was lawful, the defendant's only argument against introduc-
tion of those tapes was the defendant's own violation of Title 111.164
In United States v. Traficantl6 5 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio found, in dicta, an exception to section 2515
based on the legislative history of section 2511(2)(d). 166 The Traficant
160. Walder, 347 U.S. at 64-65.
161. Id. at 65.
162. Id.
163. United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1973). The court
read the legislative history of § 2515 as making it clear "that [§ 2515] should not
be construed as requiring exclusion of the evidence in circumstances such as
those before us." Id. at 509.
164. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105. The Underhill decision makes no mention that
the seizure of the tapes by federal agents was unlawfully effectuated. Defendants
argued that since their own actions were unlawful and did not fall within any of
the statutory exceptions to § 2515, the evidence obtained by the illegal intercep-
tions must be suppressed. Id. at 108.
165. 558 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
166. In Traficant, an elected Sheriff was indicted for accepting bribes from
1989]
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court found that the language of section 2511(2)(d) cannot be construed
alone, but must be construed in the context of the entire act and its
purposes.' 6 7 The court reasoned that barring admission of tapes re-
corded for an illegal purpose would afford privacy protection for illegal
activities. 1 68 The court stated that Congress could not have intended to
protect discussions of illegal activities, 169 and that "[s]uch an interpreta-
tion of the statute would shield from prosecutorial inquiry the alleged
activities of organized crime, the very evil which the Act was designed to
control." 170 This conclusion goes beyond the Vest holding in that it re-
fuses to give section 2515 suppression protection to even the victim of
an interception if the court finds the subject matter of the intercepted
conversation was "illegal activities."
The First Circuit in Vest held that under section 2515, the illegally
intercepted communications should have been suppressed.' 7 ' Like the
defendant in Traficant, the defendant in Vest was the victim of an illegal
interception, not the perpetrator.17 2 The dual intent of Congress in en-
acting section 2515 was to compel compliance with Title III and thereby
protect the privacy of innocent victims.' 73 The court reasoned that the
latter of these goals would be effectuated by suppression in Vest and thus
the recording was properly suppressed. 174 The First Circuit thus dis-
agreed with the Traficant dicta' 7 5 that "illegal conversations" do not
certain organized crime figures, the Carrabiases. Id. at 998. The FBI learned of
the bribes through tape conversations between Traficant and the Carrabiases.
Id. The recordings were made by Charles Carrabias without the knowledge or
consent of Traficant. Id. Thus, Traficant was, like the defendant in Vest, a victim
of an interception.
The defendant moved to suppress the tape recordings pursuant to § 2515
claiming that they were made for an impermissible purpose and thus were not
within the exception of § 2511(2)(d). Id. at 1000. The district court held that
the defendant did not meet his burden of proof of showing that the tapes were
recorded for a criminal purpose, and therefore dismissed the motion. Id. at
1000-01. After reaching this conclusion, the court examined the legislative his-
tory of § 2511(2)(d) and found an exception to § 2515 when the topic of the
intercepted communications involves illegal activities. Id. at 1002 (dicta).
167. Id. at 1002.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (dicta).
171. United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 479 (1st Cir. 1987).
172. Id. at 479.
173. See id. at 481 (citing Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48, 50
(1972) (§ 2515 is important as protection for victim of unlawful invasion)); see
also United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1973) (§ 2515 imposes
evidentiary sanction to compel compliance with Title III).
174. Vest, 813 F.2d at 481, 484.
175. Id. at 483 n.4. The court stated: "We . . .reject ... the conclusion
reached in United States v. Traficant that section 2511(2)(d) does not operate to
ban the disclosure of illegally-intercepted communications where the communi-
cations themselves were for the purpose of furthering 'illegal activities.' " Id.
(citation omitted). The First Circuit rejected Traficant because the decision ig-
[Vol. 34: p. I111
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provide an enforceable expectation of privacy with respect to Title III,
holding instead that Congress did not intend to confer discretion on
courts to develop exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 176
The First Circuit's approach in Vest, therefore, is that the victim of
an interception which does not fall within the exception under section
2511(2)(d) because it was made for an improper purpose is entitled to
have evidence obtained by that interception suppressed pursuant to sec-
tion 2515. This approach is consistent with both the plain meaning and
the legislative history of Title III.177 The recording of the conversation
with Vest was committed for a criminal purpose and Vest should there-
fore have been protected from the subsequent use or disclosure of that
recording, except for the possible use of that evidence in impeachment
proceedings. 178
The First Circuit found that Congress did not intend to permit the
courts to create exceptions to section 2515.179 The court thus declined
to do so even after noting favorably the government's argument that
literal readings of a statute are inappropriate if plainly at variance with
the policy of the legislation as a whole. 180 The suppression in Vest up-
held the protection of privacy at the expense of excluding evidence use-
ful for combatting crime. This is nevertheless an expected consequence
of the balance sought by Congress in the enactment of the statute.' 8 '
The situation in Vest differs from the situation in Underhill, and
therefore, the cases may be distinguished on their facts. In Underhill, the
defendant was not a victim of an illegal interception, instead he was the
perpetrator of that interception. 182 Requiring suppression in this situa-
tion clearly would have produced an absurd result' 8 3 and thus, even
though suppression in this circumstance does not comport with a literal
interpretation of the statute, it furthers the policies of Title III as found
in the legislative history. 18 4 In Underhill, suppression would have en-
couraged non-compliance with the Act' 8 5 while section 2515 was
nored the purpose of protection of privacy which is essential to Title III. Id. at
483.
176. Id. at 482-84.
177. For discussion of the legislative history and judicial interpretation of
§§ 251 1(2)(d) and 2515, see supra notes 57-104 and accompanying text.
178. For further discussion of the use of interceptions which violate Title
III for impeachment purposes, see supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
179. Vest, 813 F.2d at 482-84.
180. Id. at 480. For further discussion of the role of statutory interpreta-
tion, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
181. See Vest, 813 F.2d at 481.
182. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 107-08. For further discussion of the facts of
Underhill, see supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
183. Id. at 111 (suppressing tapes will serve neither purpose of protecting
privacy nor prevention of misuse of contents of illegally intercepted communica-
tion against party to such communications).
184. Id. at 112.
185. Id. at 109. Suppression would encourage non-compliance because
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designed to compel compliance.18 6 This result would be directly con-
trary to the goals sought by Congress in enacting Title 111.187 Section
2515's goal of protection of privacy is designed to protect the victim of
an intercepted communication, not the interceptor, and thus neither
goal of Title III would have been furthered by suppressing the evidence
in Underhill.
The judicial and legislative history of Title III shows that section
2515 is not an absolute bar to the introduction of all evidence obtained
in any violation of the various provisions of Title III, including section
2511(2)(d).18 8 For example, section 2515 is not self-executing but can
only be asserted on a motion to suppress, 189 and can only be asserted
when a party moving for suppression has standing to invoke it. 19 °
Other exceptions to the suppression requirement of section 2515
have been allowed, including the use of evidence obtained in violation
of section 2511(2)(d) for impeachment purposes'91 and the marital ex-
ception allowed by one court.19 2 Furthermore, in a motion to suppress
based on an alleged violation of section 2511(2)(d), the party seeking to
suppress has the burden of showing that an interception was made with
a criminal or tortious purpose. This burden of proof requirement indi-
rectly limits the scope of section 2515.193 The recent amendment of
criminals could deliberately violate the law against interceptions and benefit
from suppression of the evidence of their wrongdoing. See id.
186. See Vest, 813 F.2d at 481.
187. See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 109-112. Suppression would facilitate organ-
ized crime by allowing criminals to suppress evidence of their wrongdoing. Fur-
thermore, it would not facilitate protection of privacy in this situation because
the government here seeks to introduce the evidence against the perpetrators of
the violation, not against a victim, and there is no evidence that any victim of the
violation would be injured by disclosure under the circumstances. Id. at 112.
For discussion of the congressional purpose behind the enactment of Title
III, see supra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text.
188. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977) (violation of identi-
fication and notice requirements of wiretap applications does not require sup-
pression); United States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1974) (suppression only
required for violation of central or at least functional provisions of Title III).
For discussion of the violations of Title III which do not require suppres-
sion, see Note, supra note 40.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1982). See also United States v. Phillips, 540
F.2d 319, 325 (8th Cir.) (§ 2518(10)(a) provides remedy for right created by
§ 2515), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976).
190. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1982). Standing under § 2518 is granted
to an "aggrieved person" as defined in § 25 10(1 1). For a discussion of these
statutory provisions, see supra note 20.
191. United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 508-10 (5th Cir. 1973). For
further discussion of the use of unlawfully intercepted communications for im-
peachment purposes, see supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
192. See In re Marriage of Lopp, 268 Ind. 690, 703-05, 378 N.E.2d 414, 421
(1978).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 326 (8th Cir. 1976).
For a further discussion of the burden of proof required to prove a violation of
§ 251 1(2)(d), see supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
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section 2511 (2)(d) also shows a congressional concern with the breadth
of that section. 19
4
The interplay between section 2515 and other provisions of Title
III indicates that the purposes behind the statute are to achieve a balance
between privacy and crime control. Neither interest outweighs the other
and both have been fulfilled in the decisions in Vest and Underhill.
This interpretation is supported by the decision in United States v.
Cantley, 19 5 an unreported memorandum opinion, where Underhill and
Vest were both cited as authority and were used coextensively and con-
sistently. In Cantley, the defendants were convicted on various gambling
charges' 96 and contested their conviction on the grounds, inter alia, that
the government was erroneously permitted to use tape recorded tele-
phone conversations of bets being placed. 19 7 The situation in Cantley
was similar to the situation in Underhill in that the criminal defendants
had tape recorded conversations about illegal gambling with a confeder-
ate.' 98 The district court held that the government could rely on the
tapes because the defendants recorded their own conversations as part
of their illegal activity. 199 The court held that the situation fell squarely
within the rationale of Underhill because the defendants had made an
illegal recording and were attempting to use section 2515 to protect
themselves from the evidence of their criminal activity. 20 0 Furthermore,
the court held that a confederate of the defendants could not use section
2515 because, like the co-conspirators in Underhill, he had waived his
right to privacy by participating in the illegal activity. 20 1 The confeder-
ate in the scheme argued that the tapes were inadmissible against him
under the rationale of Vest because he did not participate in or consent
to the recordings. 20 2 He further contended that the tapes would only be
admissable against him under the rationale of Underhill if he were
charged with conspiracy. 20 3
The court rejected both of these arguments because of the degree
194. For a discussion of the recent amendments to Title III, see supra notes
64-68 and accompanying text.
195. United States v. Cantley, Crim. Nos. 86-00293-02-06 (E.D. Pa. July 8,
1987) (1987 WL 13668).
196. Id. at 26.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 29.
199. Id. at 29-36. See also United States v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 650 F.
Supp. 490, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (government allowed to introduce lawfully ac-
quired tapes when government did not tape or participate in recording).
200. Cantley, 1987 WL 13668 at 28.
201. Id. See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946)
(party may be responsible for co-conspirator's offenses even if he does not par-
ticipate in or have any knowledge of the offenses).
202. Cantley, 1987 WL 13668 at 28.
203. Id.
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of the confederate's involvement with the illegal gambling operation. 20 4
The court reasoned that the government need not charge the operator
of an illegal gambling business with conspiracy in order to use the Un-
derhill theory. 20 5 Furthermore, according to the court, this confederate
could not be said to have been "an unwitting participant" in the taped
recordings, and thus a victim thereof, given his familiarity with the set-
up of the establishment. 20 6 Therefore, this defendant's reliance on Vest
was misplaced. 20 7
Based on the reasoning in the Underhill decision, the Cantley court
found that the seized tapes were admissible against defendants who ac-
tually made the recordings and also against the defendant who acted as
a confederate in the illegal gambling activity. 20 8
While not of great precedential value, the district court decision in
Cantley effectively highlights the crucial factual differences between Vest
and Underhill. The defendant in Vest was purely a victim of the intercep-
tion and had no interest in the purpose behind the interception. The
overriding concern in Title III with the privacy of communications re-
quired suppression in these circumstances. In Underhill, however, the
defendants were aware of, or actually participated in the recordings and
derived some benefit from the making of those recordings. 20 9 They
were aware of the criminal purpose behind the recordings and thus
could not rely on section 2515 to prevent the government from intro-
ducing the best evidence available of their wrongdoing. 2 10 Therefore,
the decision in Cantley correctly treats Vest and Underhill as consistent de-
cisions, with the crucial factual distinctions being the identity of the
party seeking suppression and his or her degree of participation in the
illegal interception.
VII. CONCLUSION
A practical approach to the interaction of sections 251 1(2)(d) and
2515 is to view the motion to suppress from the standpoint of the per-
204. Id. at 29-30.
205. Id..
206. Id. The court stated: "In this case, [the confederate] operated a gam-
bling business that routinely memorialized its wagers on tape. Therefore, even
if [the confederate] did not install the tape machine himself, he would be hard
pressed to argue that he was an unwitting participant in the recording." Id. at
30.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 30. See also Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112 (co-conspirator bound by
acts of other co-conspirators and waived his right of privacy in communications
in furtherance of that conspiracy).
209. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 108, 112. The defendants in Underhill used the
tape recordings to settle disputes with gamblers about the amount of wagers
made. Id. at 108. For further discussion of the facts of Underhill, see supra notes
135-42 and accompanying text.
210. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112.
142 [Vol. 34: p. I111
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss1/5
1989] THE SUPPRESSION SANCTION 143
son seeking suppression. An innocent victim of an interception would
suffer a loss of privacy from the introduction of illegally intercepted evi-
dence whereas suppression would enable the perpetrator of the illegal
interception to benefit from his illegal acts. The result in the latter case
would also be to deprive prosecutors of very probative evidence of
wrongdoing.
Once a criminal or tortious purpose is shown under section
2511 (2)(d) the focus should shift to the identity of the person seeking to
suppress the evidence. The perpetrator of the interception should not
be allowed to benefit from his wrongful acts and an innocent victim
should not have his protected privacy interest violated. The decisions of
the First and Sixth Circuits in Vest and Underhill accurately reflect the
intent of Congress in enacting the suppression section of Title III and
are therefore consistent in'their interpretation of that act.
Thomas M. Smith
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